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1. Fredrich Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra in THE PHILOSOPHY OF NIETZSCHE 6

(1954). By the expression "God is dead," Nietzsche meant that belief in God had declined to
such a degree that God was no longer a force of consequence in the minds of men. Nietzsche
believed that, once men realized that their moral principles were founded on the belief in a
God which no longer existed (i.e. one in which they had lost faith), they would abandon the
moral principles associated with that God in search of new ones. Nietzsche feared that the
growing acceptance of the theory of evolution would lead men to conclude that there was no
distinction between man and animal, and he attempted to propose an alternate foundation for
the new morality. SAMUEL ENOCH STUMPF, SOCRATES TO SARTRE 372 (1975). The Court's

jurisprudence in Establishment Clause cases since 1947 has excluded religion from the public
sector, killing God metaphorically, while attempting to preserve the ideals which flow from
belief in God.
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INTRODUCTION

You say that I am a king. For this I have been born andfor this I have
come into the world in order to witness to the truth. Everyone' who
is of
2
truth?
is
"What
him,
to
said
Pilate
voice.
my
the truth hears
In 1980, the Supreme Court in Stone v. Graham3 addressed the issue of
whether a statute requiring the display of the Ten Commandments4 in all
public school classrooms was an unconstitutional establishment of religion.'
Applying the Lemon test, 6 which requires a secular purpose in order to pass
Establishment Clause7 scrutiny, the Court found the statute's purpose to be
religious and ruled it unconstitutional.' The Court stated, "The Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths,
and no claim of secular legislative purpose can change this." 9 Yet, had the
state required the placement of the following "secular commandments" in
every classroom, it is unlikely that the Court would have found an Establishment Clause violation."1

2. John 18:37-38 as quoted in JOHN T. NOONAN, THE BELIEVER & THE POWERS THAT
ARE 10 (1987).
3. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
4. Exodus 20:1-17 (New American).
5. Stone, 449 U.S. at 39-40 (effective June 17, 1978). The statute provided:
(1) It shall be the duty of the superintendent of public instruction, provided sufficient
funds are available as provided in subsection 3 of this section, to ensure that a durable,
permanent copy of the Ten Commandments shall be displayed on a wall in each public
elementary and secondary school classroom in the Commonwealth. The copy shall be
sixteen (16) inches wide by twenty (20) inches high.
(2) In small print below the last commandment shall appear a notation concerning the
purpose of the display as follows: "The secular application of the Ten Commandments is
clearly seen in its adoption as the fundamental legal code of Western civilization and the
Common Law of the United States."
(3) The copies required by this Act shall be purchased with funds made available through
voluntary contributions made to the state treasurer for the purposes of this Act.
Id. (citing Kentucky Statute).
6. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). The Lemon test asks three questions of state action: (1)
does the action have a secular or religious purpose, (2) is the primary effect of the action one

which neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) does the statute create unnecessary entanglement between church and state? Id. If any one of these elements favors religion or entangles the State with religion, the action is unconstitutional. Id.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Establishment Clause reads: "Congress shall make no law

respecting an establishment of religion." Id.
8. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980).
9. Id.
10. One wonders whether the Court would still have found the statute unconstitutional if
the state had required portions of Hammurabi's Code, which was revealed to him by Manu,
the sun god, to be posted in classrooms for the same secular purpose, viz. education.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol23/iss4/7

2

Rodriguez: God Is Dead: Killed by Fifty Years of Establishment Clause Jurisp

COMMENT

1992]

1157

THE TEN "SECULAR" COMMANDMENTS

A person commits an offense if he knowingly or intentionally desecrates

a place of worship."

(You shall not have other gods besides Me.) 2
Before testifying, a witness shall by oath or affirmation, declare that he
will testify truthfully. "
(You shall not take the name of the Lord, your God, in vain.) 4
No suit shall be commenced, nor process served on Sunday; and all
legal holidays shall be treated as though they were Sunday."'
(Remember to keep holy the sabbath day.) 6
17
The rights of the elderly are to be preserved.
(Honor your father and your mother.)18
A person commits criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly, or with criminal negligence causes the death of an
individual. 19
(You shall not kill.)2"

Everyone guilty of adultery shall be fined not less than one hundred and
no more than one thousand dollars.2 1
(You shall not commit adultery.)2 2
A person commits an offense if he unlawfully appropriates property
with the intent to deprive
the owner of that property.2 3
24
(You shall not steal.)

A person commits an offense if he intentionally makes a false statement
under oath with the intent to deceive.2 5
26
(You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor.)
11. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1992).

12. Exodus 20:3 (New American).
13. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 603; see also TEX. R. CIv. P. 226 (requiring that jurors swear to
answer questions truthfully on voir dire "so help you God").
14. Exodus 20:7 (New American).
15. TEx. R. Civ. P. 6; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. § 4591 (Vernon 1976).
16. Exodus 20:8 (New American).
17. See TEX. HUM. REs. CODE ANN. § 102.003 (Vernon 1990) (setting out twenty-three
rules regarding how the elderly are to be protected in general).
18. Exodus 20:12 (New American).
19. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.01(a) (Vernon 1989).
20. Exodus 20:13 (New American).
21. Former TEX. PENAL CODE ART. 502, repealedby Act of Jan. 1, 1969, 61st Leg., ch.
888, § 6, 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws 2707.
22. Exodus 20:14 (New American).
23. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(a) (Vernon 1989).
24. Exodus 20:15 (New American).
25. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.02 (Vernon 1989).
26. Exodus 20:16 (New American).
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A person commits an offense if, with specific intent to commit an offense, he does an act amounting to more than mere preparation to commit sexual assault, but fails to complete the act.2 7
(You shall not covet your neighbor's wife.)2"
A person commits an offense if, with specific intent to commit an offense, he does an act amounting to more than mere preparation to unlawfully deprive an individual of property, but fails to complete the
act. 29
30
(You shall not covet your neighbor's goods.)
These "secular commandments" mirror the Ten Commandments, with one
major exception: they do not take their authority from a supreme being, but,
rather, from the secular state.31 Yet it is obvious that these statutes reflect
the Judaeo-Christian roots of our society,3 2 roots in which the majority of
Americans still believe.3 3

27. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992) (defining criminal attempt); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021 (Vernon 1989) (defining and proscribing sexual
assault). The analogous commandment to this provision refers to "covet[ing] thy neighbor's
wife." Exodus 20:17 (New American). Coveting is defined: "to have or to satisfy an extreme
desire." WESTrER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 421 (1979) (emphasis added).
Because it is impossible for positive (human) law to punish intent without the manifestation of
some act, the most that positive law can prevent or punish is the outward manifestation of
intent. This is one reason why a divine law (laws based on revealed truths) is necessary-to
proscribe internal violations of law which demean the dignity of the human being. THOMAS
AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE la-Ilae, Q. 91, art. 4.
28. Exodus 20:17 (New American).
29. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992) (defining criminal attempt); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01 (Vernon 1989) (defining and proscribing theft).
30. Exodus 20:17 (New American).
31. These two sources of law, God and the state, are the foundations of the two principal
types of legal philosophy, natural law and positivism. JOHN FINCH, INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL THEORY 22, 29 (3d ed. 1979). See generally ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1-24 (1963) (outlining historical shifts from natural law to positive
law).
32. These roots are displayed by numerous legislative enactments with clearly religious
origins. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 6103(a) (1980) (declaring Thanksgiving and Christmas national
holidays); 36 U.S.C. § 172 (1988) (placing reference to God in "The Pledge of Allegiance"); 36
U.S.C. § 169h (1988) (authorizing a National Day of Prayer); 36 U.S.C. § 186 (1985) (declaring "In God We Trust" the national motto); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 449 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (pointing out religious statements in "The Star-Spangled Banner").
33. See Religion in America: 50 Years: 1935-1985, in THE GALLUP REPORT 50 (May
1985) (ninety-five percent of Americans believe in the existence of a supreme being). The
religious roots of our society link democratic principles to transcendent aspirations. Yehudey
Mirsky, Note, Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause, 95 YALE L.J. 1237, 1249-51
(1986); see also Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1606,
1652 (1987) ("The entrenchment of religion in American public life-its presence in the dominant moral, and cultural fabric of society-has been termed a defacto establishment of religion
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Stone v. Graham illustrates in small what the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence has become. The Court has misconstrued the
meaning of "establishment of religion" to require a complete separation between religion and government. 34 At the same time, the Court has attempted to preserve the ethical principles which naturally spring from
religion.3 5 This cannot be done, for belief in a supreme being is the foundation of all the rights-life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness-which the framers held, and Americans today hold dear.36 As Alexis de Tocqueville

prevail[ing] throughout the land" quoting M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS II
(1965)).

34. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also John
W. Whitehead & John Conlan, The Establishment of the Religion of Secular Humanism and
Its First Amendment Implications, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 22-23 (1978) (the Court's construction of the Establishment Clause has replaced religion with secular humanism). Interpretation of the Establishment Clause has gone so far as to say that the word "respecting" in the
phrase "no law respecting an establishment of religion" includes laws which show reverence,
regard, or good will toward religion. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 648-49
(1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952).
"When the state encourages religious instruction ... it follows the best of our traditions...
[flor it then respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates the public service to
their spiritual needs". Id.
35. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1946) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(stating that basic premise underlying public schools is "that secular education can be isolated
from all religious teaching so that the school can inculcate all needed temporal knowledge and
also maintain a strict and lofty neutrality towards religion"). The language from Everson has
been interpreted to mean that only secular morality should be taught in the public school.
John C. Polifka, Use of the Lemon Test in the Review of Public School CurricularDecisions
Concerning "Secular Humanism" Under the Establishment Clause, 33 S.D. L. REV. 112, 112
n.* (1988). Contra Church of the Holy Spirit v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892) (stating that civil government is dependent upon religious principles); John W. Whitehead & John
Conlan, The Establishment of the Religion of Secular Humanism and its First Amendment
Implications, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 60-61 (1978) (stating that roots of American law are
based on theistic truths).
36. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 529 n.2 (1965) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(alluding to impossibility of completely separating religion from law). Justice Rehnquist noted
that everything of value in our culture is saturated with religious influences. See Stone, 449
U.S. at 46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice Jackson's concurrence in McCollum v.
Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 235-36 (1948). Justice O'Connor has also argued that religion cannot be separated from the law by pointing out the absurdity of holding a murder
statute unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause simply because the Ten Commandments proscribe murder. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 70 (O'Connor, J. concurring); see also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 594 (1987) (recognizing that the Ten Commandments played
more than a religious role in western civilization). The Court's language in Stone regarding
the Ten Commandments demonstrates the difficulty experienced by the Court in attempting to
justify the separation of religion from principles with religious origins. The Court found the
posting of the Ten Commandments on classroom walls unconstitutional because the purpose
in posting them was "to induce [children] to read, meditate upon, [and] perhaps venerate and
obey [them]." Stone, 449 U.S. at 42.
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observed:
What has struck me most about my country [France], more especially
these last few years, is to see ranged on one side men who prize morality, religion, and order; and upon the other, those who love liberty and
the equality of men before the law. This spectacle has struck me as the
most extraordinary and the most deplorable ever offered to the eyes of
man; for all the things that we separate in this way, are, I am certain,
united indissolubly in the eyes of God. They are holy things.3 7
Rather than favoring religious belief, the Supreme Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence has transformed the laudable goal of religious toleration into a requirement of non-endorsement of religion by the government.38
However, all of this may soon change.
On November 6, 1991, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in the
case of Lee v. Weisman.3 9 Deborah Weisman, a high school student, challenged the constitutionality of a prayer said at a public high school graduation ceremony.' Both the district court and United State Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit found the prayer to be an unconstitutional establishment of religion. 4 ' Lee gives the Court an excellent opportunity to re-ana37.

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, OUVRES ET CORRESPONDANCE INItDITES

(emphasis added),

quoted in

JOHN

T.

NOONAN, THE BELIEVER

& THE

1, 432 (1861)

POWERS THAT ARE

160-61 (1987).
38. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (deviation from framers' intent of prohibition of a national religion has led to decisions preventing government from
endorsing religion generally); John W. Whitehead & John Conlan, The Establishment of the
Religion of Secular Humanism and Its FirstAmendment Implications, 10 TEX. TECH. L. REV.
1, 23 (1978) (theism has been disestablished and replaced by secular humanism).
39. Lee v. Weisman, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct.
1305, 113 L. Ed. 2d 240 (Mar. 18, 1991) (No. 90-1014). For partial transcript of the oral
argument see Schools and Colleges: Benediction at Graduation Ceremony-Establishment
Clause, 60 U.S.L.W. 3351, 3351 (Nov. 12, 1991).
40. Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68, 69 (D.R.I. 1990). The invocation was given by a
rabbi who prayed:
God of the Free, Hope of the Brave: For the legacy of America, where diversity is celebrated and the rights of minorities are protected, we thank You. May these young men
and women grow up to enrich it.
For the liberty of America, we thank You. May these new graduates grow up to guard it.
For the political process of America in which all its citizens may participate, for its court
system where all can seek justice we thank You. May those we honor this morning always turn to it in trust.
For the destiny of America we thank You. May the graduates of Nathan Bishop Middle
School so live that they might help to share it.
May our aspirations for our country and for these young people, who are our hope for the
future, be richly fulfilled.
Id. at n.2.
41. Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68, 75 (D.R.I. 1990), aff'd, 908 F.2d 1090, 1099 (1st
Cir. 1990). The district court applied the Lemon test and found that the prayer given at the
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lyze and bring its present jurisprudence into better harmony with the
framers' original intent.42 Part I of this comment will discuss the framers'
intent in enacting the Establishment Clause. Part II will show how the present construction of the Establishment Clause under Lemon v. Kurtzman is
flawed. Part III will then address itself to two possible alternatives, the endorsement test and the coercion test, each of which is favored by various
members of the Court.
I.

THE FRAMERS' INTENT

More than in other areas of constitutional law, the Supreme Court has
attempted to ensure that the application of the Establishment Clause comports with the original intent which motivated its adoption.43 As Justice
Rehnquist stated, "The true meaning of the Establishment Clause can only
be seen in its history."' The present state of Establishment Clause jurisprudence evolved from the Supreme Court's 1941 decision in Everson v. Board
of Education.4 5 In Everson, the Court upheld a New Jersey program reimbursing the parents of children attending private schools for transportation
CoStS. 4 6 Yet, borrowing language from Thomas Jefferson, the court stated
that the Establishment Clause was intended to "erect a wall of separation
between Church and State."4 7 Jefferson's metaphor intimates a stark line

graduation ceremony violated Lemon's second prong by involving the state in the endorsement
of religion. Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68, 71 (D.R.I. 1990). The Court of Appeals reluctantly affirmed. Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090, 1094 (1st Cir. 1990).
42. See Interview with Dean Choper, 60 U.S.L.W. 2253, 2253-54 (Dec. 3, 1991) (stating
that Lee gives the "new" Court an opportunity to indicate the direction it will take concerning
the Establishment Clause); L. Anita Richardson, Overruling Lemon v. Kurtzman?, 1991-92
SuP. CT. PREY. 93, 93 (Nov. 6, 1991) (Westlaw, SCT-PREVIEW database) (outlining arguments of petitioner which include request that Lemon be abandoned).
43. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107-14 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (looking
to history of Religion Clause in order to determine its proper application); Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 671 (1970) (refusing to
construe Religion Clause so as to defeat its historical purposes); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 667 (1970) (stating that Court will not undermine constitutional objective of Religion
Clause by overly literal interpretation); Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Comment, Is Lemon a Lemon?
Crosscurrents in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 129, 136-39 (1990)
(analyzing history surrounding enactment of Establishment Clause to determine true intent of
the framers).
44. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
45. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
46. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16. The Everson Court borrowed this metaphor from Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162-64 (1878), which borrowed it from Jefferson's letter to the
Danbury Baptist Association. See JOHN T. NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS
THAT ARE 130-31 (1987) (reproducing the letter from Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist
Association).
47. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
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between government and religion,4" and has become the touchstone of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.49 However, many critics point out that
when one looks into the history surrounding the adoption of the clause, a
different picture emerges.5 °
At the time that the Constitution was ratified, many of the states feared
that Congress might use the Necessary and Proper Clause 5 to establish a
national religion.52 To prevent this, the framers proposed placing a clause in
48. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 18 (stating that First Amendment erected a wall between
church & state); see also GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN
AMERICA 1 (1987) (stating that Everson "opened the modem era of church-state jurisprudence); Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., Establishment According to Engel, 76 HARV. L. REV. 25, 31
(1962) (stating that Everson was the most influential decision in the history of American
church-state jurisprudence). Justice Black stated that the wall erected by the First Amendment between church and state "must be kept high and impregnable." Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
The slightest breach of this wall should not be allowed by the Court. Id.
49. See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673 (citing Everson and the "wall" metaphor in beginning majority's analysis); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 802 (1983) (mentioning wall of
separation); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116, 123 (1981) (citing to wall of separation);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 611 (1971) (citing Everson with approval, then setting out
new Establishment Clause test which would become known as the Lemon test). But see Wallace, 472 U.S. at 91-92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that Everson's use of Jefferson's
"wall between church and state" metaphor has led Establishment Clause jurisprudence down
roads never intended by the framers); Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Comment, Is Lemon a Lemon?
Crosscurrents in Contemporary Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 129,
132 (1990) (Lemon test resulting from "wall metaphor" has been unwieldy in application).
50. Several justices have suggested that the understanding of the framer's intent as expressed in Everson does not seem to be what the framers truly had in mind. See Texas
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, - U.S. -, -, 109 S. Ct. 890, 909, 103 L. Ed. 2d 1, 25-32 (1989)
(Scalia, J. dissenting) (attacking Lemon test as unfounded in Constitution, history, or precedent); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (stating that Establishment Clause
jurisprudence has been built on the foundation of a misleading metaphor); Wallace, 472 U.S. at
91 (White, J. dissenting) (reviewing history of Religion Clauses demonstrates the need to revise
Lemon). Many academians also believe that it is beyond question that the generation of Americans which enacted the First Amendment believed that government must aid religion to se-

cure its own survival. See, e.g.,

GERARD

V.

BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN

5 (1987) (Christianity has "united", if not defined the United States government);
Edward M. Gaffney, Jr., Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines.- The Entanglement of the
Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis U. L.J. 205, 220-21 (contemplating legitimate relationship between political activism & religious groups) (1980). See generally
AMERICA

DAVID BARTON, THE MYTH OF SEPARATION

115-24 (1989) (listing quotations from the

founding fathers which indicate their understanding of the role which religion should play in
society).
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.18. The Necessary and Proper Clause states: "Congress
shall have the power.... To make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution
the forgoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the
United States, or in any department or office thereof." Id.
52. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 730 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). Madison stated that this was the
driving force behind the adoption of the Religion Clause. However, he refused to comment on
whether the amendment was necessary. Id.
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the Bill of Rights to protect freedom of conscience from governmental coercion. 53 The framers proposed the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause-not as two separate clauses, but-as a single guarantee to
preserve freedom of religion. 54 During the debate concerning the adoption
of a Religion Clause, however, some of the framers expressed opposition,
because, as they saw it, the Constitution created a government of limited
powers-anything not granted being withheld." The government, therefore, could not establish a national religion because the Constitution did not
expressly grant the power to do so.5 6 Nonetheless, the majority of the colonies favored placing some sort of protective provision in the Constitution. 7
During the debate, James Madison summarized the thrust of the Religion
Clause: "Mr. Madison said, he apprehended the meaning of the words to be,
that Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to

53. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 730 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). Representative Carroll spoke for
those in favor of adopting a provision concerning religion saying: "As the rights of conscience
are, in their nature, of peculiar delicacy, and will little bear the gentlest touch of governmental
hand; and as many sects have concurred that they are not well secured under the present
constitution [I am] much in favor of adopting the words." Id.
54. See Walz, 397 U.S. at 668 (implying that Religion Clauses were written as guarantee
of freedom of religion). Chief Justice Burger stated: "The Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses of the First Amendment are not the most precisely drawn portions of the Constitution.
The sweep of the absolute prohibitions in the Religion Clauses may have been calculated; but
the purpose was to state an objective, not write a statute." Id.; see also Wallace, 472 U.S. at 68
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Although a distinct jurisprudence has enveloped each of these
Clauses, their common purpose is to secure religious liberty."); Thomas R. McCoy & Gary A.
Kurtz, A Unifying Theory for the Religion Clauses of the FirstAmendment, 39 VAND. L. REV.
249, 274 (1986) (suggesting that the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses should be read
as one). Neither American history nor tradition "justifies an apportionment of values between
disestablishment and freedom or indeed the dichotomy itself." LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH,
STATE, AND FREEDOM 122 (1953).

55. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 730 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (Representative Sherman
stated that Congress could not enact laws concerning religion because it had not been given the
power to do so).
56. Id.
57. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 93 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that many of the colonies favored the enactment of a religion clause). Out of the thirteen colonies, ten proposed
amendments to the Constitution-some colonies did so after ratifying the Constitution, while
some refused to ratify unless the amendments were made. New Hampshire and New York
proposed a declaration of religious freedom, 3 JONATHON ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 659 (1891), as did Virginia. I JONATHON ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION at 328 (1891). Rhode Island and North Carolina would not ratify
unless the Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution. Id. at 334; 4 JOHATHON ELLIOTT,
DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 244 (1891). Cf H.R. Res. 4, 1st Cong. (1789)
(the text of the resolution to amend the Constitution was approved by a two-thirds majority in
each house of Congress).
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their conscience.",5 1 Madison suggested that the word "national" be placed
before "religion" (i.e. Congress shall establish no national religion), to
"point the amendment directly to the object it was intended to prevent.""
Although agreeing in principle, Federalists opposed this language for fear
that those favoring a centralized, rather than federal, government might
twist the use of the word "national" to that end.' The clause as adopted
reads "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
nor prohibiting the free exercise thereof."'"
From reading the debate, it is clear that the Establishment Clause was
intended to protect religion from government by preventing the establishment of a national religion. 62 This is a far cry from a "wall of separation" in
that the framers in no way intended to exclude religion, but rather to include
and protect it-to protect freedom of conscience from coercion by the majority. 63 Examination of legislation favoring religion which the framers en-

58. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 730 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). Thomas Jefferson, who is the
source of the "wall" metaphor, expressed a similar understanding:
I consider the government of the U.S. as interdicted by the Constitution from intermeddling with religious institutions, their doctrines [etc]. This results not only from the provision that no law shall be made respecting the establishment, or free exercise of religion,
but also from that which reserves to the states the powers not delegated to the U.S.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Rev. Samuel Miller (Jan. 23, 1808), reprintedin 9 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 174 (P. Ford ed. 1898); see also THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST
FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 210 (1986) (concluding that Americans from the colonial period understood establishment "as an exclusive government preference for one religion").
59. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 731 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).

60. Id. The United States government was intended to be a government of limited powers with most power remaining in the states. Many feared a centralization of power at the
federal level, which is revealed by their apprehension in placing the word "national" in the
Establishment Clause. Id.
61. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
62. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 730 (Joseph Gales, ed., 1789) (Madison suggested that reli-

gion be modified by word national-Congress shall establish no national religion); see also
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 660 (1989) (framers understood establishment as
direct interference with religious liberty); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 686 (holding Christmas display
constitutional because it does not tend to establish a state religion). The main evil the framers
hoped to prevent was the coercion of Americans to act contrary to the dictates of their con-

science. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 68 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Religion Clause aimed at
securing religious liberty).
63. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 660 (framers considered coercing one to practice or believe
in religion and establishing of religion synonymous); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 67-68 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (Religion Clause seeks to secure religious liberty); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 731 (Jo-

seph Gales ed., 1789) (emphasizing need for care in drafting clause lest it be taken in such a
way as to be hurtful to cause of religion); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1868 (1970) (commenting on Framers' intent). Story stated

that "when the First Amendment was adopted, the general, if not the universal sentiment in
America was, that Christianity ought to receive encouragement from the state, so far as it was
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acted after the Religion Clause illustrates this point. One obvious example is
the enactment of legislation allocating money for the support of missionaries
to convert the Indians." Proclamations by several presidents of a national
holiday of fasting and prayer in thanksgiving "to Almighty God,"6 5 and
Congress' employment of a chaplain-paid with tax dollars-to open each
legislative session with a prayer, are other examples of acts by the framers
endorsing religion. 66 Even Thomas Jefferson, author of the "wall" metaphor, mentioned God four times in the Declaration of Independence 67 and,
in his inaugural address, encouraged Americans to give thanks to God.68
Having looked briefly over the history of the Establishment Clause, the
next logical question is: Does the present jurisprudence conform with the
original intent? Let us take Madison's understanding as the ruler against
which to measure present Establishment Clause jurisprudence: "that Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it
by law, nor 69
compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to their
conscience."

not inconsistent with the private rights of conscience and the freedom of worship." Id.; see
also Thomas R. McCoy & Gary A. Kurtz, A Unifying Theory for the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment, 39 VAND. L. REV. 249, 274 (1986) (arguing that level of judicial interven-

tion resulting from Court's application of Religion Clause is directly proportionate to risk of
governmental oppression of religion).
64. See Treaty between the United States of America and the Kaskaskia Tribe of Indians,
Aug. 13, 1803, 7 Stat. 78, 79 (providing for payment of $100 annually towards support of a
Catholic Priest "who will engage to perform for the said tribe [of Indians] the duties of his
office and also to instruct [the children of the tribe] in the rudiments of literature"); Act of
June 1, 1796, ch. 46, 1 Stat. 490-91 (providing funds for propagating gospel among Indians).

The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 was re-enacted by the First Congress. Act of Aug. 7, 1789,
ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50. The statute included language both protecting and endorsing religion. Id. at
52, Art. I, Art. III; see also Act of Feb. 20, 1833, ch. 42, 4 Stat., 618, 619 (authorizing sale of

land for support of religion, and for no other purpose).
65. The first such proclamation was issued by President George Washington. 1
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897 64 (James D. Richardson, ed., 1897).

John Adams also issued such a proclamation which called for "fasting, and prayer" and mentioned God, "the Redeemer of the World," and the Holy Spirit. Id. at 268-69.
66. Both the House of Representatives, H.R. JOUR., 1st Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1826 ed.),
and the Senate, S. JOUR., 1st Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1820 ed.), elected chaplains to open their
respective legislative sessions with prayer. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 788 (citing House & Senate
Journals). Additionally, on September 22, 1789, Congress enacted a statute to provide for the
payment of these chaplains. Act of Sept. 22, 1789, ch. 17, 1 Stat. 70, 71 (1789).
67. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776) (mentioning God four times

throughout).
68. 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897 at 323 (James D. Richard-

son ed., 1897). Counting the blessings of Americans, Jefferson encouraged them to give thanks
to divine providence which grants happiness in this life and the next. Id.
69. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 730 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
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PRESENT ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE

Present Establishment Clause jurisprudence dictates a three-part test for
determining when state action constitutes an establishment of religion. The
Lemon Test, formulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman,7" asks: (1) is the purpose of
the state action religious; (2) is its principal or primary effect one that establishes or inhibits religion; and (3) does the state action foster "an excessive
government entanglement with religion?"'" If the answer to any one of
these elements is "yes," the state action is deemed an unconstitutional establishment of religion. 7 2 While deceptively innocuous on its face, the Lemon
test has yielded inconsistent results,7" and its application by the Court has
been erratic.74 Many of the justices on the Court, six of them in fact, have

70. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
71. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13; see also Wallace, 472 U.S. at 55-56 (applying Lemon test
to hold unconstitutional a required moment of silence before beginning class at public school,
during which students may pray); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (applying Lemon
test to hold posting Ten Commandments in public school classrooms unconstitutional); Developments-Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1644-46 (1987) (outlining and

criticizing Lemon test).
72. Stone, 449 U.S. at 40-41. Often, whether a Lemon violation exists hinges on whether
the state action in question has a religious rather than secular purpose, thus violating the first
prong of the test. See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56 (holding moment of silence for prayer at
public school unconstitutional due to religious purpose); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (finding a
secular as well as religious purpose in the display of a criche in a city's Christmas display and
holding the display constitutional); Stone, 449 U.S. at 41 (holding that display of Ten Commandments in classrooms violated "secular purpose" prong of Lemon test). This element of
the test has been criticized because, whether an act satisfies or violates it depends on how the
Court chooses to characterize the state action in question. This allows the Court to pick and
choose what will be held constitutional. See Developments-Religion And The State, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1607, 1646-47 (1987) (Lemon test allows majority to place an imprimatur on
those practices which it believes are acceptable).
73. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 580, 594 (applying Lemon test, majority and dissent
reached diametrically opposed conclusions). Compare Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 25054 (1977) (holding loan of books containing maps by state to parochial schools not violative of
Establishment Clause) with Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 373 (1975) (holding loan of maps
by state to parochial schools violates Establishment Clause). With regard to the inconsistency
of Establishment Clause decisions, one critic states "Commentators have been irresistibly
drawn to 'Alice in Wonderland' allusions." Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions,And DoctrinalIllusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV.
266, 269 (1987) citing G.GOLDBERG, RECONSECRATING AMERICA 75 (1984) (stating that

"Burger's opinion in Lemon v. Kurtzman seems to have been written by the Mad Hatter);
LEONARD LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

181 (1986) (establishment decisions seem to come from "a Humpty Dumpty Court, which, as
Humpty told Alice, thinks words can mean anything it says they mean"); Phillip Kurland, The
Religion Clauses and the Burger Court, 34 CATH. L. REV. 1, 10 (1984) (Establishment decisions seem "derived from Alice's adventures in Wonderland").
74. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 639-40 (1987) (Scalia, J. dissenting); see also
Board of Educ. of the Westside Community Schs. v. Mergens,
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expressed their dissatisfaction with the Lemon test for varying reasons. 75 In
a scathing dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree,76 then Justice Rehnquist recited a
litany of self-contradictory decisions all of which were fruits of the Lemon
test.77 For example,
[A] State may lend to parochial school children geography textbooks
that contain maps of the United States, but the State may not lend maps
of the United States for use in geography class.... A state may pay for
bus transportation to religious schools but may not pay for bus transportation from the parochial school to the public zoo or the museum for
a field trip .... Religious instruction may not be given in public schools,
but the public school may release students during the day for religion
classes elsewhere, and may enforce attendance at those classes with its
truancy laws.7 8
While critics have attacked the unpredictability of the Lemon test and the

difficulty which courts have had applying it, 79 the primary criticism leveled

2371, 110 L. Ed. 2d 191, 197 (1990) (majority gave Lemon lip service, but applied endorsement
standard); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792-95 (1983) (ignoring Lemon test entirely);
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.) (calling Lemon "nothing but a
helpful signpost"); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252 (1982) (declining to apply Lemon);
Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 100 (1980) (stating that under Lemon the
Court has "sacrificed clarity and predictability for flexibility"); Meek, 421 U.S. at 358 (stating
that Lemon is not easily applied); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 799
(1973) (calling Lemon a guideline); William J. Cornelius, Church and State-The Mandate of
the Establishment Clause: Wall of Separation or Benign Neutrality?, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 8
(1984) (stating that critics are almost unanimous in finding Court's handling of Establishment
Clause "inconsistent and unprincipled"); Thomas R. McCoy & Gary A. Kurtz, A Unifying
Theory for the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 39 VAND. L. REV. 249, 252 (1986)
(stating that Court's approaches and results are impossible to reconcile).
75. See, e.g., Bullock, - U.S. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 909, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 25 (Scalia, J.
dissenting) (Justice Scalia failed to find a constitutional, precedential, or historical basis for
Lemon); Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 589 (Blackmun, J.) (mentioning Lemon test in passing, then
applying endorsement test); Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 655 (Kennedy, J. dissenting) (applying
Lemon test, but repudiating it as primary guide in Establishment Clause cases); Wallace, 472
U.S at 69 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (urging "a refinement of the Lemon test); Wallace, 472
U.S. at 112 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (criticizing Lemon test as confused and historically unfounded); Regan, 444 U.S. at 662 (White, J.) (stating that unpredictability will be the rule in
Establishment Clause cases until "interaction between the courts and the States-the former
charged with interpreting and upholding the Constitution and the latter with seeking to provide education for their youth-produce a single, more encompassing construction of the Establishment Clause.").
76. Wallace, 472 U.S. 38.
77. Id., at 110-11 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
78. Id. (citing Wolman, 433 U.S. at 249; Meek, 421 U.S. at 362-66; Zorach, 343 U.S. at
306; Illinois ex rel. v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 203 (1948)).
79. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Reflections on the Role of Purpose in the Jurisprudenceof the
Religion Clauses, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 997, 997 (1986) (noting that "virtually everyone
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against Lemon, by the Court and academians alike, is the inaccurate reading
of the historical understanding of the term "establishment" which formed
the foundation for the decision in Lemon.80 Contrary to the framers' understanding that the Religion Clause was intended to prevent the establishment
of a national religion, s1 many acts, which in no way establish a national
religion, have been found to violate the Establishment Clause under Lemon.
The Court has held that the display of a creche on public property establishes religion.8 2 Requiring display of the Ten Commandments in public

school classrooms is also unconstitutional.8 ' Even requiring a moment of
silence in public schools during which students may voluntarily pray constitutes the establishment of a religion under Lemon analysis.84
The Supreme Court's most recent Free Exercise Clause decision mirrors
the anti-religious slant of its Establishment Clause decisions. During the
history of free exercise jurisprudence, the Court has changed its approach to

who has thought about the religion clauses finds the Supreme Court's treatment of religion
clause issues unsatisfactory"); John T. Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment
Clause Doctrine, 48 U. Prr. L. REV. 83, 129-40 (1986) (discussing problems with the concept
of neutrality and the Lemon test); Larry Preece, Note, Wallace v. Jaffree: A New Twist on the
Old Lemon?, 13 W. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 662-67 (1986) (addressing failures of Lemon test in
light of Wallace decision).
80. See, e.g., Bullock, - U.S. at -, 109 S.Ct. at 909-15, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 25-32 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (attacking historical basis of Lemon); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 112 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing Lemon test as blurred and historically unfounded); Wallace, 472 U.S. at
91 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that history does not support Lemon); Ivan E. Bodensteiner,
The "Lemon Test," Even with All its Shortcomings, is not the Real Problem in Establishment
Clause Cases, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 409, 409 (1990) (arguing that precision would "take some of
the fun out of constitutional law" and "decrease the need for creative lawyers," and that,
despite Lemon's shortcomings, the fact that its elements "encourage us to discuss the same
issues" may be all we can expect of any constitutional standard); Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Comment, Is Lemon a Lemon? Crosscurrents in Contemporary Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 129, 159 (1990) (pointing out that present Establishment Clause
jurisprudence does not conform with original understanding).
81. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 730 (Joseph Gales, ed., 1789) (suggesting wording Establishment Clause to prevent "establishment of a national religion"); see also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 686
(basing decision of fact that governmental action at issue did not tend to establish a state
religion).
82. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 598. The Court per Justice Blackmun found display of a
creche in a county courthouse unconstitutional. Id. This decision is worthy of note in that
Blackmun applied both the Lemon test and the endorsement test, and found the display unconstitutional under both. Id. at 592-93.
83. Stone, 449 U.S. at 42-43. The Court emphasized that the purpose of placing the Ten
Commandments in the classroom was to encourage students to venerate them. Because they
are sacred text in the Judaeo-Christian traditions, requiring their display in public school classrooms was an establishment of religion. Id. at 41-42.
84. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 61. The majority held that the amendment of the "moment of
prayer" statute's language from requiring a moment of silence for "meditation" to "meditation
or voluntary prayer" was an establishment of religion. Id. at 58-60.
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free exercise cases from one allowing indirect burdens on religion," to one
which balanced the burdens on religious practice against state interests,86
and, recently, back to one which will tolerate legislation placing an indirect
burden on religion.87 In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,8 8 the Supreme Court struck down a challenge to an Oregon
law which criminalized the use of peyote.89 The petitioner, a Native American Church member, protested that use of peyote was a part of religious
ceremonial rites practiced by church members. 9' The Court did not deny

85. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 152-53 (holding bigamy statute as applied to Mormons constitutional). In the earliest Free Exercise case, the Court interpreted the Free Exercise Clause
to mean that government could not interfere with religious beliefs, but could affect religious
practices. Id. This interpretation of the clause was maintained as late as 1961. See Braunfeld
v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605-06 (1961) (holding that Sunday closing laws did not discriminate
against Orthodox Jewish merchants who kept Sabbath on Saturday); Developments in the
Law-Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1607, 1706 n.9 (1987) (detailing Court's
reasoning as to indirect impacts in Braunfeld).
86. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (allowing Seventh Day Adventist
who refused to work at a job which required her to work on Sunday in violation of her religious beliefs to receive unemployment compensation). The balancing test in Sherbert requires
the state to show a compelling interest before it could inhibit free exercise. Id. at 407-09. The
Sherbert test was applied mostly to unemployment compensation cases and to allow Amish
children to be educated at home after the eighth grade. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233 (Amish
may remove children from public school after eighth grade); Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind.
Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707, 719 (1981) (granting Jehovah's witness unemployment compensation after he refused to work for religious reasons). But see United States
v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (denying Amish right to be exempt from social security tax).
The Court slowly drifted away from the broad reading of Free Exercise accommodation in
Sherbert. Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1607, 1709
(1987).
87. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990)
(holding that conviction of Native American Church members for ingesting peyote during a
religious ceremony in violation of a criminal statute proscribing use of peyote was constitutional). The Court held that the law was generally valid and neutral, and only impacted religion indirectly. Id. at 878. Although this decision changes the standard used in determining
whether government action violates free exercise, it is questionable whether the decision works
a serious change on the results of free exercise attacks when one considers the restricted application of Sherbert and the high probability that any challenge to governmental action would
fail Sherbert analysis. Douglas Kmiec, The Original Understandingof the FreeExercise Clause
and Religious Diversity, 59 UMKC L. REV. 591, 596-97 (1991).
88. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Smith involved a free exercise challenge of an Oregon statute
criminalizing the use of peyote. Id. at 874. The statute was challenged by two members of the
Native American Church who were fired from their jobs for using peyote. Id. They were
refused unemployment benefits because they had been fired for work-related misconduct and
brought suit under the Free Exercise Clause. Id.
89. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. The Court stated that the law was nondiscriminatroy and
refused to overturn it. Id.
90. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. The use of peyote by Indians in religious ceremonies has been
documented since the 1700s. OLIVER STEWART, PEYOTE RELIGION: A HISTORY 27-28
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the legitimacy of his religion, nor the sincerity of his belief; it simply held
that the state may pass laws inhibiting the free exercise of religion if the
law's primary purpose is secular, and is rationally related to a legitimate
state interest. 91 The decision in Smith smacks of that tyranny of the majority over the minority which is one of the great perils of representative government. 92 A very similar situation arose in 1919 under the Eighteenth
Amendment-prohibition. 93 In the case of alcohol, however, federal legislation exempted the use of alcohol for sacramental purposes. 94 Smith puts
Native American Church members in a dilemma akin to that of Thomas
More, to follow conscience or the law. 9" Requiring Americans to choose
between obeying their religion or the law does not seem to be what the
Framers understood from the words "freedom of conscience." 9 6 However,
the Smith decision is a fairly recent one, and it is unclear whether or when
the Court will again alter its approach to the Free Exercise Clause.97

(1987). Early on, the Europeans on the North American continent attempted to outlaw peyotism; the Oregon statute is simply the latest attempt. See generally Craig J. Dorsay & Lea A.
Easton, Employment Division v. Smith: Just Say "No" to the Free Exercise Clause, 59 UMKC
L. REV. 555, 565-69 (1991) (outlining a general history of peyotism).
91. See id. at 885-88. The majority, per Justice Scalia, refused to apply strict scrutiny and
require the showing of a compelling governmental interest before legislation infringing on free
exercise could be found constitutional. See id. Justice O'Connor dissented, favoring adherence
to Sherbert's requirement that the state show a compelling interest outweighing the imposition
on religious liberty before it could interfere with the exercise of religion. Id. at 899.
92. See JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 1-19 (1984) (explaining the dangers of tyranny of the
majority). Mill warned that democracy, if not closely watched, could lead to the oppression of
minorities who lacked the representative power to change the law. Id. (see especially pp. 5-11).
93. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 21. The Eighteenth Amendment outlawed "intoxicating liquors" nationwide and gave Congress and the
states the power to enforce the prohibition. Id. at § 2.
94. See National Prohibition Act, 41 Stat. 305, 308 (1919). "Liquor for nonbeverage
purposes and wine for sacramental purposes may be manufactured, purchased, sold, bartered,
transported, imported, exported, delivered, furnished, and possessed, but only as herein provided." Id.
95. See generally THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 313-14 (1988) (detailing the
life of Thomas More). More was an English official under King Henry the Eighth. Id. at 313.
As a Catholic, he refused to profess under oath that King Henry was the head of the Church
on earth. Id. The choice cost him his life. Id.
96. See James Madison's Letter to William Bradford, in JOHN T. NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE 97-98 (1987) (detailing religious persecution in the
colonies); 1 ANNALS OF CONG., 730 (Joseph Gales, ed., 1789) (Representative Carroll stated
clearly that the Religion Clause should be enacted to protect religion which "will little bear the
gentlest touch of governmental hand").
97. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Smith
was decided on April 17, 1990.
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CHANGE IN THE AIR: THE ALTERNATIVES

In its more recent Establishment Clause decisions, the Supreme Court has
"tried to clarify, if not find a better approach than, Lemon.""8 In Marsh v.
Chambers,9 9 the Court ignored the Lemon test altogether and held that the
opening of Nebraska legislative sessions with a prayer, and paying a chaplain
out of tax dollars to lead it, was not an Establishment Clause violation."°°
The Court based its decision on the history supporting this practice.11 One
year later, in Lynch v. Donnelly,1" 2 the Court, per Chief Justice Burger,
again emphasized the role of religion in American history holding that the
display of a creche on public property, as part of an annual Christmas display, was constitutional as an acknowledgement of a celebration recognized
in the western world for two thousand years."0 3 The Chief Justice noted that
the cr6che in no way "pose[d] the danger of establishment of a state
church. ''1° This language seems to mirror Madison's which placed the
98. See Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 153-57 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating that
recent Supreme Court decisions attempt to clarify or revise Lemon); see also Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933, 940
(1986) (stating that renewed attention given to the element of coercion suggests that the present test should be changed).
99. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
100. Id., at 795. The Court outlined the history underlying the practice, emphasizing
that the framers provided for such prayer at the opening of congressional sessions. Id.
101. Id. at 790. While the Court stated that history alone was insufficient to require a
finding of constitutionality, it went on to explain that in this case it was sufficient because, in
addition to Nebraska's long history of prayer opening each legislative session, the framers
themselves chose to open sessions of the federal legislature with prayer. Id. Thus, this practice
must clearly have been within the bounds of the framers' understanding of the Establishment
Clause. Id. Basing constitutionality on the history of a practice has met with mixed applications. Compare Jager v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 829 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding prayer at public school commencement violated Lemon irrespective of the history of the
tradition and was therefore unconstitutional) with Stein v. Plainwell Community Sch., 822
F.2d 1406, 1410 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding prayer at commencement ceremony sufficiently
grounded in tradition to withstand Establishment Clause scrutiny). Courts have refused to
apply the historical analysis of Marsh in other contexts as well, See North Carolina Civil
Liberties Union Legal Found. v. Constangy, 947 F.2d 1145, 1152 (1991) (holding opening
court sessions with prayer violates Establishment Clause). See generally James J. Dean, Ceremonial Invocations at PublicHigh School Events and the Establishment Clause, 16 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 1001 (1989) (analyzing the court's application of Marsh in Stein and the court's refusal to apply Marsh in Jager,and concluding that prayer at commencement ceremonies will
not survive Establishment Clause scrutiny at the Supreme Court level.
102. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
103. Id. at 687.
104. Id. at 686. The Court in Lynch applied the Lemon test, focusing its analysis on
whether there was a secular purpose for the display of the creche and concluded that there
was. Id. at 680-81. But, five years later, in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Justice Blackmun
held the display of a creche in a county courthouse to be unconstitutional. Allegheny, 492 U.S.
at 579. In the same opinion, however, Blackmun held constitutional the display of an 18 foot
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word "national" before "religion," rather than Jefferson's "wall metaphor"
which gave birth to Lemon.' 0 5
Based on the number of Justices voicing their dissatisfaction with Lemon,
it seems likely that there will be a change in the standard used to determine
whether state action constitutes an establishment of religion."
Among
those justices who have suggested an alternative to Lemon, three camps exist: those favoring an endorsement test,' 0 7 those favoring a coercion test,10 8

Menorah and a 45 foot Christmas tree. Id. at 616. Blackmun emphasized that the 40 foot tree
validated the Menorah by secularizing it, since the Christmas tree has become a secular symbol
for the winter season. Id. at 616. In his concurrence, Justice Brennan seemed fascinated by
Blackmun's logic in concluding that an 18 foot tall Menorah would attract less attention than
an average size Christmas tree. Id. at 642 (Brennan, J., concurring). Brennan believed that
the religious nature of the 18 foot Menorah would spill over onto the tree, rather than viceversa. Id. Justice Kennedy dissented from Blackmun's opinion emphasizing that "[w]hether
the crehe be surrounded by poinsettias, talking wishing wells, or carolers, the conclusion
remains the same, for the relevant context is not the items in the display itself but the season as
a whole," and would have held the creche constitutional. Id. at 666 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
105. Compare Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) ("Any notion that these symbols pose a real danger to the establishment of a state church is far-fetched indeed") (emphasis
added) with 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 731 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (Madison suggesting that "national" modify "religion" in Establishment Clause to aim the amendment at the evil it was
intended to prevent).
106. See e.g. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,

-

U.S ....

109 S.Ct. 890, 909, 103 L.

Ed. 2d 1, 25-32 (1989) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (attacking Lemon test as unfounded in Constitution, history, or precedent); Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 591 (Blackmun, J.) (mentioning Lemon test
in passing, then applying endorsement test); Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 655 (Kennedy, J. dissenting) (applying Lemon test, but repudiating it as primary guide in Establishment Clause cases);
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S 38, 68-69 (1985) (O'Connor, J. concurring) (urging "a refinement"
of the Lemon test); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 112 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (criticizing Lemon test
as confused and historically unfounded); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646,
662 (1980) (White, J.) (stating that Lemon is unpredictable and should be changed). Only
three justices have failed to comment on Lemon's inadequacy: Stevens, Souter, and Thomas.
Justices Souter and Thomas have not had the opportunity. Justice Stevens has been called the
Court's strictest separationist, Synopsis of United State Law Week Constitutional Law Conference, 60 U.S.L.W. 2253, 2256 (Dec 3, 1991), and it is likely that he will favor the stricter of the
tests available. See Board of Educ. of Westside Community Sch. v. Mergens, - U.S.....
110 S. Ct. 2356, 2366-67, 110 L. Ed. 2d 191, 200 (1990) (holding eight to one that use of public
school facilities for meetings of extracurricular religious organization was required under the
Equal Access Act and was constitutional-Justice Stevens was the only dissenter).
107. Justices O'Connor and Blackmun favor the endorsement test. See Mergens, - U.S.
at -, 110 S.Ct. at 2371-73, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 215-17 (Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices
Blackmun, White, and Chief Justice Rehnquist applied the endorsement test after reviewing
constitutionality under Lemon); Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 591 (Blackmun applies the endorsement test in the majority opinion). Justice O'Connor is the author of the endorsement test.
See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-94 (Justice O'Connor first proposes the endorsement test); Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1607, 1647 (1987) (explaining
Justice O'Connor's reformulation of Lemon as non-endorsement test). See generally Steven D.
Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions.-Establishment Neutrality and the "No

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol23/iss4/7

18

Rodriguez: God Is Dead: Killed by Fifty Years of Establishment Clause Jurisp

19921

COMMENT

1173

and those who are undecided." °9
A.

Non-endorsement of Religion

The Court's strongest proponent of the endorsement test as a refinement
of Lemon has been Justice O'Connor. "o Recently, Justice Blackmun, joined
the bandwagon by applying the endorsement test in his majority opinion in
County of Allegheny v. ACL U."' Justice White has also expressed approval

Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH.L. REV. 266, 268-76 (1987) (outlining evolution of endorsement
test).
108. Justices Kennedy and Scalia favor the coercion test. See Mergens, - U.S. at -, 110
S. Ct. at 2376-77, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 212-14 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (joined by Justice Scalia,
Justice Kennedy criticizes endorsement test in favor of a coercion analysis); Allegheny, 492
U.S. at 655-670 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (Justice Kennedy proposes coercion test as substitute
for Lemon joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and White); James E. Ellsworth,
"Religion" in Secondary Schools: An Apparent Conflict of Rights-Free Exercise, the Establishment Clause, and Equal Access, 26 GONZ. L. REV. 505, 525 (1990/91) (Justices Scalia and
Kennedy favor coercion standard). The coercion test appears to have been taken in large part
from a dissenting opinion by Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. See
American Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 132-40 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (proposing coercion as Establishment Clause standard).
109. Justices Rehnquist and White have joined in opinions applying both tests. Compare
Mergens, - U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 2371-73, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 215-17 (Justice O'Connor,
joined by Justices Blackmun, White, and Rehnquist, applies the endorsement test after reviewing constitutionality under Lemon) with Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 655-70 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (Justice Kennedy proposes coercion test as substitute for Lemon and is joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and White). Although attacking Justice Kennedy's criticisms of the endorsement test, Justice Stevens does not seem to prefer one test over the other.
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 650 n.6 (Stevens, J., concurring).
110. Justice O'Connor first proposed the endorsement test in Lynch v. Donnelly. See
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-94 (proposing endorsement as an alternative to Lemon); Developments
in the Law-Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1607, 1647 (1987) (stating that Justice
O'Connor prefers an endorsement analysis to Lemon); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions,
and DoctrinalIllusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH.
L. REV. 266, 271 (1987) (analyzing Justice O'Connor's endorsement test). Since proposing the
test, Justice O'Connor has applied it frequently in Establishment Clause cases. See, e.g., Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 620-21 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (applying endorsement test and finding
creche display unconstitutional); Corporation of The Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327,
348-49 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Free Exercise benefits to religion do not violate or
implicate endorsement test); School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 391-92 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (giving benefits to private school students at public expense is unconstitutional
endorsement of religion).
11. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 591-93 (applying endorsement test to hold display of
cr6che in county courthouse unconstitutional). The endorsement test has been applied by the
majority on other occasions. See Mergens, - U.S. at -, 110 S.Ct. at 2371-73, 110 L. Ed. 2d
at 214-18 (using endorsement test to find use of public school facilities for meetings of religious
organizations pursuant to the Equal Access Act constitutional); Bullock,__ U.S. at -, 109 S.
Ct. at 896, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 25 (stating that at the very least Establishment Clause prevents
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of endorsement as a replacement for the Lemon test." 2 O'Connor's version
of the endorsement test proscribes, "[d]irect government action endorsing
religion or a particular religious practice ...because it sends the message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents
that they are insiders,
3
favored members of the political community.""
Analysis reveals that the endorsement test is inadequate in several ways,
the first being its inconsistency with existing jurisprudence defining religion.
The Supreme Court's early definitions of religion all included some allusion
to a supreme being." 4 In 1961, the Court first stepped away from requiring
belief in God as an element of religion." 5 The Court's most recent definition
describes religion as "[a] sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the
life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by ... God [in traditional

religions]." 16 By applying this definition, the Court has exempted persons
from military service who would otherwise have had to serve in the armed
forces." 7 It is questionable whether this understanding of the breadth of
conscientious objector status is in conformity with the framers' intent."'
endorsement and holding that tax exemption for religious publications violates Establishment
Clause).
112. Mergens, - U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 2371-73, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 211-12 (Justice White
joins Justice O'Connor's opinion applying the endorsement). Contra Allegheny, 492 U.S. at
655-70 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (Justice Kennedy's dissent proposes coercion test as substitute
for Lemon and is joined by Justice White).
113. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor stated: "The
endorsement test does not preclude government from acknowledging religion or from taking
religion into account in making law and policy. It does preclude government from conveying
or attempting to convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or
preferred." Id. at 70.
114. See United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931) (Hughes, J., dissenting)
(religion is "belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any
human relation"); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890) (defining religion as "one's views
of his relations to his Creator, and . . . the obligations they impose of reverence for his being
and character, and obedience to his will").
115. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.ll (1961) (including Buddhism, Taoism, ethical culture, and secular humanism in the definition of religions which do not teach
belief in the existence of a God).
116. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339 (1970); see also United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965) (first stating the definition used in Welsh). The Court in Welsh found
that even though Welsh had denied that he was "religious," his conclusion that war was ethically immoral, without any reference to God or a supreme being, was sufficient to qualify as
religious belief. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 338.
117. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 343; Seeger, 380 U.S. at 186-88. Both of these cases required the
Court to determine whether non-traditional religious beliefs satisfied the definition of "religion" for purposes of determining conscientious objector status. In both cases the Court held
that purely secular ethical systems were "religious." Welsh, 398 U.S. at 342; Seeger, 380 U.S.
at 166.
118. See I ANNALS OF CONG. 749-50 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (discussing inclusion of a
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However, focusing for a moment on how the Court has chosen to define
religion, an inconsistency appears with regard to the application of that definition to the endorsement test. 119 The Supreme Court has explicitly included secular humanism, an ethical system based on evolution, science, and
the belief that all men have inalienable rights by their nature, 120 within the
definition of religion.12 1 Under an endorsement analysis, any state action
which endorses religion or a particular religion is unconstitutional.' 22 Yet
the government endorses secular humanism in that secular humanist principles form the foundation for education in public schools.' 23 Thus, the prob-

conscientious objector provision in the Bill of Rights). The framers debated placing a clause in
the Bill of Rights which stated: "no person religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to bear
arms." Id. at 750. Throughout the debate, the discussion speaks in terms of those being religiously scrupulous. Id. at 749-50. Whether the framers would have agreed with the Court's

definition of religion cannot be determined.
119. See generally Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions,and DoctrinalIllusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 295-300 (1987)
(analyzing problems with definition of religion as applied to endorsement test). Smith's analysis discusses only two problems concerning the definition of religion: viewpoint and standing.
Smith concludes that the endorsement test will (1) create an avenue by which persons with
unconventional views of religion may attack governmental policy on religious grounds and (2)
force the Court into more clearly defining religion, which will undoubtedly muddy the already
murky waters surrounding the Establishment Clause. Id. at 300.
120. See John W. Whitehead & John Conlan, The Establishment of Secular Humanism
and its FirstAmendment Implications, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1,37-54 (1978) (defining secular
humanism). This definition is a composite. Whitehead and Conlan list the following as the
main tenets of secular humanism: the denial of the relevance of a deity, the supremacy of
human reason, the inevitability of progress, science as a guiding force for progress, adherence
to the theory of evolution, and the centrality and autonomy of man. Id.
121. See School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (calling secular
humanism a religion); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n. 11 (1961) (including secular
humanism in the definition of religion). Courts have gone so far as to say that atheism may be
a religion under the Establishment Clause. Theriault v. Silber, 547 F.2d 1279, 1281 (1977);
Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1326 (1977).
122. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (clarifying definition of endorsement test).
123. When the tenets of secular humanism are measured against public school curricula,
it seems that many of them are promoted in the place of belief in a theistic religion. See
Everson, 330 U.S. at 23-24 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (stating that basic premise underlying public schools is "that secular education can be isolated from all religious teaching so that the
school can inculcate all needed temporal knowledge and also maintain a strict and lofty neutrality towards religion"). Compare Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968) (holding
that there is no valid secular reason for not teaching evolution in public schools) with Edwards,
482 U.S. at 593 (holding statute which required teaching creationism whenever evolution is
taught unconstitutional). Yet only one case thus far has found an establishment of secular
humanism in the classroom. See generally Smith v. Board of Sch. Commr's of Mobile County,
655 F. Supp. 939 reversed 827 F.2d 684 (1lth Cir. 1987) (finding that many books used in
public school omitted references to Judaeo-Christian history to the point of discrimination and
requiring their removal from schools).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

21

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 23 [2022], No. 4, Art. 7

1176

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 23:1155

lem becomes: if secular humanism is a religion, and the endorsement test
prohibits the endorsement of any religion, then
the endorsement test prohib124
its the endorsement of secular humanism.

This inconsistency cannot be remedied, because it is impossible for government not to endorse something by its actions. Every act of government is
grounded in certain fundamental principles which determine what is good

and what is evil. 125 Government must, and does, endorse a certain world
view every time it acts. 126 If government endorses purely secular ethical
principles intended to be religiously neutral, those principles constitute a
religion-they are a system of values which can take the place of belief in a
supreme being in the life of their possessor, and that, by the Court's definition, is a religion. 1 27 The endorsement test is unworkable because it is im-

124. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 674 n. 10 (Kennedy, J., dissenting and concurring) (stating
that endorsement test would require the separation of all religious symbolism from government); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions,and DoctrinalIllusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 295-300 (1987) (pointing out that
under endorsement test, how one defines religion will determine what views government can
support).
125. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (law is constantly based on morality); cf Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (analyzing
the theory underlying the majority's decision); PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF
MORALS 9 (1965) (law and legal systems are based on moral principles). Before a legislator
can identify a problem which needs to be remedied, he must have some standard by which he
to judge whether something is right or wrong, appropriate or inappropriate-in other words,
he must have certain beliefs. See Anselm of Canterbury, Proslogion, in PHILOSOPHY IN THE
MIDDLE AGES 150 (Arthur Hyman & James Walsh eds., 1987) ("For I do not seek to understand so that I may believe; but I believe so that I may understand. For I believe this also, that
'unless I believe, I shall not understand.' "); cf Welsh, 398 U.S. at 341-44 (court's holding that
individual claiming to be irreligious was religious because his ethical principles were the foundation for his choices between right and wrong implied that everyone has to believe in something); Thomas R. McCoy & Gary A. Kurtz, A Unifying Theoryfor the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment, 39 VAND. L. REV. 249, 255 (1986) (paraphrasing Justice Black, "Any governmental interference with religion necessarily would involve at least an implicit approval of
establishment of other beliefs or practices considered acceptable").
126. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (majority's decision endorsed economic theory to which majority of Americans did not subscribe);
Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions,and DoctrinalIllusions. Establishment Neutrality and
the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 287-88 (1987) (describing fictitious conversation between opponent of aid to parochial schools and devout legislator who sponsored
such aid, showing that the legislator's religious beliefs affected his vote); John W. Whitehead &
John Conlan, The Establishment of the Religion of Secular Humanism and its First A mendment Implications, 10 TEx. TECH L. REV. 1, 64-65 (1978) (arguing that prevalence of secular
humanism is promoted by judicial relativism).
127. See Welsh, 398 U.S. at 338 (holding that belief system taking place of traditional
religion in person's life is a religion). The Court held that, even though an individual denied
belief in a religion, he did believe in a religion-although he did not know it. This was true
because his conclusion that war was ethically immoral, although drawn solely from ethical
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possible for government to take a position which does not endorse some
ethical belief system.' 2 8
Not only does the endorsement test promote secular humanism, it has the
actual effect of opposing theism almost to the point of coercion in two ways.
For example, the Court's decision in Marsh v. Chambers,129 as well as application of the endorsement test in other cases, allows governmental participation in religious expressions and practices, but only when they have become
so secularized that they have no religious value. 130 The Court in Marsh upheld opening the legislative session with a prayer because the practice had a
strong historical foundation. 3 ' The opinion states implicitly, "When prayer
comes to be only a formalistic adherence to past practice, rather than an
invocation of a supreme being, then it is acceptable." This treatment of
prayer amounts to coercion of belief in secular humanism. 132 It appears that

principles without appeal to a supreme being, took the place of traditional religious beliefs in
his life. Id.
128. See Allegheny 492 U.S. at 675 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (government must choose
either absolute separationism or complete accommodation to create a bright line rule); PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 9 (1965) (law and legal systems are based on
moral principles); Thomas R. McCoy & Gary A. Kurtz, A Unifying Theory for the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, 39 VAND. L. REV. 249, 255 (1986) (whenever state action
interferes with religion, it is because government is making decisions based on a belief system
not completely aligned to that religion); cf Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (choosing traditional morality as foundation for decision).
129. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
130. See, e.g., Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 625 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (religious practices
which, through their "history and ubiquity" have come to serve secular ends, do not violate
Establishment Clause); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 716 (stating that many religious practices are
shielded from Establishment Clause scrutiny because they have lost their religious significance
through rote repetition); McGowan v. State of Md.,366 U.S. 420, 503-04 (1961) (religious
practices which lose their significance over time often retained for secular purposes). The
system composed of these practices has been called "American civil religion." Developments in
the Law-Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1647 (1987).
131. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793-94. The Court emphasized that the history of the practice
was relevant in determining the framers' intent as to the scope of the Establishment Clause.
Id. at 794-95.
132. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 76-77 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that encouragement of meditation is permissible under endorsement test while prayer is not). In Jaffree,
O'Connor applied the endorsement test and found a statute unconstitutional which required a
moment of silence in schools during which students could meditate or voluntarily pray because
"1prayer" was included as an option. Id. at 77. She points out that the statute appears constitutional because it does not favor the child who chooses to pray over the child who chooses to
meditate. Id. at 76-77. However, she finds the statute unconstitutional solely because it endorses prayer, and states that a similar statute excluding the word "prayer" would be constitutional. Id. at 72-73. The effect of this reasoning is to favor the meditating child over the
praying child, or the secular over the religious. See John W. Whitehead & John Conlan, The
Establishment of the Religion of Secular Humanism and its First Amendment Implications, 10
TEX. TECH L. REV. 1,22-23 (1978) (stating "Once the state moves in the direction of adopting
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under the endorsement test, a state could post the "secular commandments"
in classrooms since they have been stripped of all1 religious
value, but the Ten
33
unconstitutional.
be
still
would
Commandments
Another inconsistency arises from the fact that the endorsement test appears more "religion-friendly" than Lemon. 134 Justice O'Connor pointed
out that the proposed endorsement test would not be unfavorable to religion,
but would allow government to acknowledge religion and take religion into
consideration while making policy.' 35 But, if the endorsement test treats
religion more favorably than the Lemon test, existing jurisprudence indicates
that the shift from one test to the other might be an establishment of religion. 3 6 In Reitman v. Mulkey, 13 1 the Supreme Court addressed the effect of
a California anti-discrimination statute being repealed.' 3 8 The Supreme

Secular Humanism as its religious and philosophical base, the result is '[e]ither complete hostile annexation of the Church or persecution of the Church by separation. Religion is then first
removed from the marketplace and the school, [and] later from other domains of public
life.' ") quoting E. VON KUEHNELT-LEDDHIN, LEFTISM: FROM DE SADE AND MARX TO
HITLER AND MARCUSE 427 (1974).

133. Cf Wallace, 472 U.S. at 70-71 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing application of
endorsement test to statute requiring a moment of silence before class at public schools during
which students "shall meditate or voluntarily pray"). In analyzing the majority's decision,
which held the statute unconstitutional, O'Connor concentrates on the language of the statute.
She concurs in the result because, under the endorsement test, the option of "prayer" in the
text of the statute endorses religion. Id. at 70-71. A similar statute without the word "prayer"
in it would pass the endorsement test, just as the "secular commandments" have had God
removed from them and would probably be constitutional. Id.
134. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 421-25 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (concluding that funding parochial schools was constitutional). Justice O'Connor argued that
Lemon's prohibition of "benign cooperation between church and state" was flawed. She
stressed that the pivotal consideration in Establishment Clause cases should be whether the
state endorses religion, rather than Lemon's blanket prohibition of interaction between church
and state. Id. Based on this reasoning, Justice O'Connor concluded that majority erred in
holding a program using federal funds to pay parochial school teachers unconstitutional. Id.;
see also School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 399-400 (1985) (Justice O'Connor
states that Lemon prohibition prong is unworkable); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions,
and DoctrinalIllusions: EstablishmentNeutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MIcH. L.
REV. 266, 320 (1987) (demonstrating that endorsement test emphasizes intent to endorse religion rather than intent to aid it, and that statutes which aid religion without intent to endorse
it pass endorsement test, but not Lemon).
135. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 70 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
136. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378-79 (1967) (holding that change in law
which seems to imply government endorsement of racial discrimination is unconstitutional).
The Court reasoned that a shift from an "affirmative action law" to a neutral law would send a
message of governmental endorsement of discrimination to the citizens. Id. at 376

137. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
138. Id. at 373-74. Reitner refused to rent an apartment to the Mulkeys (Negroes) claiming that the repeal of statutes proscribing discrimination in renting on the basis of race made

such discrimination legal. Id. at 372.
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Court, per Justice White, held that for California to change its law from one
explicitly prohibiting racial discrimination in the sale or rental of residential
property, to one which was neutral on the issue would, in fact, be a shift
away from neutrality and would send citizens a message endorsing discrimination.
The Court concluded that this shift, and the message it conveyed,
would "involve the state in private racial discrimination to an unconstitutional degree."'" Applying the same logic to the endorsement test, it seems
that, if the endorsement test is more "religion-friendly" than Lemon, as the
case law seems to indicate, then the message the Court will send by shifting
from the Lemon test to an endorsement test will not be one of neutrality;
rather, it will be perceived by the citizenry as favoring or endorsing religion
since the shift will be to a standard more favorable to religion.' 4 1 Yet, under

both Lemon and the endorsement test, the government may not act in such a
way as to "convey a message that religion ... is favored or preferred."' 4 2
Thus, a shift from the Lemon test to an endorsement test would probably fail
the endorsement test as an unconstitutional establishment of religion.' 43

Probably the most telling criticism of the endorsement test is history itself.
Many actions taken by the early legislatures, which were composed of the
framers, would probably fail the endorsement test because they clearly endorse religion.'" The declaration of a national day of Thanksgiving would

139. Id. at 376. The shift from an anti-discrimination statute to a neutral statute could
not, in context, be seen as a shift to a neutral position by the state. Id.
140. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378-79 (1967); see also Stanley Applebaum, Recent Decisions, 19 S.C. L. REV. 888, 890 (1967) (the state is involved in discrimination if it
encourages it). This problem is exacerbated when the logic from Reitman is applied to the
endorsement test because both the old and new standards, Lemon and endorsement, do not
allow for endorsement or encouragement of religion, whereas in Reitman California crippled
itself by adopting the anti-discrimination statute. See Calvin R. Harvey, Recent Decisions, 36
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 240, 244-45 (1967) (result of the logic used in Reitman cripples states
with anti-discrimination statutes from repealing them).
141. The logic in Reitner ran as follows: A shift from an anti-discriminatory position to a
completely neutral position is a shift away from anti-discrimination, and, therefore, a shift
towards discrimination. Reitner, 387 U.S. at 374-76. When applied to the endorsement test,
the logic runs: Lemon is anti-establishment while the endorsement test is neutral (i.e. more
friendly to religion). A shift from Lemon to the endorsement test, therefore, will be a shift
toward religion. Cf id. (applying same logic).
142. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 70 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
143. See American Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 135 (1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (stating that if all endorsement of religion were prohibited, then legislation favoring religious freedom would be an unconstitutional establishment of religion).
144. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 660-61 (citing numerous religious practices sanctioned by
government and found constitutional by Court); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 100 (acts of First Congress confirm that framers did not understand non-establishment to be synonymous with irreligion); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681-82 (listing numerous actions by government which assist
religion but are constitutional). Religion has been invoked throughout America's history to
give legitimacy to governmental authority. See Robert Bellah, Religion and the Legitimation
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now be unconstitutional under Allegheny v. ACLU.14 5 The allocation of
funds to missionaries for the conversion of Indians would probably fail the
endorsement test if we apply Aguilar v. Felton.14 6 Even the decision by the
framers to begin each legislative session with a prayer, led by a chaplain paid
with tax dollars, would probably be unconstitutional under endorsement
analysis.47 The Court in Marsh upheld similar legislation by the state of
Rhode Island, basing its constitutionality on the history supporting the practice.148 The framers' original decision to open with prayer, however, had no

of the American Republic, in VARIETIES OF CIVIL RELIGION 3, 11 (Robert Bellah & Phillip

Hammond, eds. 1980) (citing examples of religion used by government); Yehudah Mirsky,
Note, Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause, 95 YALE L. J. 1237, 1251-52 (1986) (stating
that religion is part of American society).
145. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 614 (applying endorsement test Court stated that "If the
city celebrates both Christmas and Chanukah as religious holidays, then it violates the Establishment Clause"). Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch applied the endorsement test and
justified the celebration of Thanksgiving by emphasizing that it had cultural significance in
addition to being a religious holiday. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 715. When the holiday of
Thanksgiving was first proclaimed, however, there was no cultural tradition to look to in order
to show a secular purpose; the purpose was clearly to endorse religion. See 1 MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897 64 (James Ricahrdson, ed. 1897) (George Washington

declaring Thanksgiving holiday as a national holiday "of public thanksgiving and prayer [to]
Almighty God"). George Washington's proclamation was probably in violation of the endorsement test.
146. See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 425 (applying endorsement test to a program providing aid
to parochial schools). Justice O'Connor found that it was permissible for the state to aid
parochial schools in teaching secular subjects, but that the state could not provide any aid
which would endorse the religious tenets of the parochial school. Id. Under this analysis, the
Treaty between the United States of America and the Kakaskia Tribe of Indians, 7 Stat. 78, 79
(Aug. 13, 1803), which provided $100 annually for a Catholic priest to carry out his religious
duties and teach the Indians English, was probably unconstitutional.
147. See Act of Sept. 22, 1789, ch. 17, 1 Stat. 70-71 (1789) (authorizing payment of fivehundred dollars annually to the chaplains for the House and Senate). Application of the logic
in Marsh, which rested primarily on the tradition of legislative prayer in America, would be
useless in that there was no tradition of such prayer at the time that the framers passed legislation providing for it. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791 (holding legislative prayer constitutional by
emphasizing its history).
148. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791. The Court stated that history alone was not sufficient to
prevent an Establishment Clause violation. Id. at 790. However, the history supporting the
practice of prayer before legislative sessions indicated to the Court that the framers did not feel
that such prayer was unconstitutional. Id. at 791. The district court in Lee addressed the
question of prayer at public school commencement exercises, and held that the Marsh analysis
did not apply because the practice was not sufficiently grounded in history to escape an Establishment violation. Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68, 73-74 (D.R.I. 1990). The Eleventh
Circuit, in analyzing the same school prayer issue, stated that religious invocations convey the
message that the school endorses religion, and therefore violate the Establishment Clause. Jager v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 831 (11th Cir. 1989); see also James Dean,
Ceremonial Invocations at Public High School Events and the Establishment Clause, 16 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1001, 1031 (1989) (stating that O'Connor's endorsement test would find prayer
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such foundation-they were the first Congress under the Constitution. 149 If
the endorsement test is in harmony with the Framers' intent, it appears that
they violated it only days after enacting the Religion Clause.1 0 This is illogical because the endorsement test is illogical.
B.

Non-coercion of Religion

Probably the most rational Establishment Clause jurisprudence to come
out of the Court thus far is the coercion test. The coercion test, would prohibit government from coercing
anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exercise; and [it
would prohibit government from], in the guise of avoiding hostility or
callous indifference, giv[ing] direct benefits to religion in such a degree
that it in fact establishes a state religion or religious faith, or tends to do
SO.151

Examples of coercion which have been held unconstitutional by the Court
include compelling or coercing participation or attendance at a religious ac-

at public school ceremonies unconstitutional). The validity of the holding in Marsh appears to
rest on the fact that the practice has a long history, and was adopted by the framers.
149. Cf American Jewish Congress, 827 F.2d at 136 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (under
an endorsement analysis, Thomas Jefferson's bill for establishing Religious Freedom would be
an Establishment Clause violation). The absence of a historical foundation for legislative
prayer would be fatal under an endorsement analysis. See Jager, 862 F.2d at 828 (stating that
prayer at public school commencement ceremony was not grounded in history and was, therefore, subject to Lemon analysis). The Jager Court's application of the "primary effects" prong
of the Lemon test is very similar to an endorsement analysis. See id. at 831. The court found
that prayer at a commencement exercise endorsed religion. Id. If such prayers were historically based, it seems that the court's conclusion would have been different. See id. at 828. See
also James Dean, Ceremonial Invocations at PublicHigh School Events and the Establishment
Clause, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1001, 1023-24 (1989) (Jagerstretched the endorsement test by
stating that even though there were several secular purposes underlying prayer at public school
ceremonies, the prayer was unconstitutional because one purpose underlying it was religious).
150. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 100-01 (implying that, under majority's reading of Establishment Clause, the framers violated the Establishment Clause days after adopting it); JOHN
T. NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE 132 (1987) (stating that within
same month, September of 1789, First Congress both created committees to select chaplains,
and adopted First Amendment which includes Establishment Clause).
151. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659; see also Mark Tushnet, Reflections on the Role of Purpose
in the Jurisprudenceof the Religion Clauses, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 997, 998 (1986) (stating that to show coercion one must show that practice at issue coerces-or compromises or
influences religious beliefs in a way that endangers religious liberty-and that practice has a
"religious purpose"). See American Jewish Congress, 827 F.2d at 137 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (calling for a change in Establishment Clause jurisprudence to a coercion test). Justice
Kennedy's formulation of the coercion test seems to draw heavily from Judge Easterbrook's
opinion. See id. at 135-40.
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tivity, 112 requiring religious oaths to obtain government office or benefits, 153
and delegating governmental power to religious groups.' 5 4 Under the coercion test, a moment of silence in the classroom would be constitutional in
that it does not coerce students to pray, but accommodates those who wish
5
5

to. 1

This accommodation seems to be in line with early legislation enacted by
the framers.' 56 For example, a national day of Thanksgiving simply gives
people the opportunity to give thanks, if they wish; it compels no one to do
so. 1 57 A prayer opening a legislative session, even if it is called an endorsement of religion, forces no one to pray; it merely accommodates those who
wish to, acknowledging that the majority of Americans believe in and worship God.' 5 1 Most importantly, the coercion test explicitly prohibits state
action directly benefitting religion to a degree that amounts to establishing a
state religion, which is precisely the evil which the framers sought to

152. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962) (holding mandatory prayer at public
schools unconstitutional); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 452 (1961) (stating that
mandatory day of religious observation would be unconstitutional).
153. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (holding unconstitutional requirement of belief in God as prerequisite for holding public office).
154. See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 127 (1982) (holding statute allowing churches to prevent liquor sales within 500 feet of their premises unconstitutional).
155. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 89 (Burger, J., dissenting) (stating that statute requiring
moment of silence before class during which student's may pray in no way threatens religious
liberty). The coercion test favors religious belief. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 660-62 (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that absent coercion, risk of establishment of religion presented by accommodation is minimal and stating that prayer before a
legislative session is non-coercive); American Jewish Congress, 827 F.2d at 137 (Easterbrook,
J., dissenting) (opening sessions of court with "God save the United States and this honorable
court," is an accommodation of religion which does not coerce).
156. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 100 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (listing examples of early
legislation which endorsed religion); 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 630-32 (5th ed. 1891) (stating that general sentiment at time First Amendment was
adopted was that Christianity should be encouraged to fullest extent that it could without
interfering with rights of conscience of others); Michael McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933, 939 (1986) (comparing recent Establishment Clause decisions with religious actions taken by framers).
157. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 660-62 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Gallagher v. Crown
Kosher Super Mkt. of Mars, 366 U.S. 617, 628 (1961) (legislative recognition of day of religious observance doe not force anyone to worship); American Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 136 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting); see also Zorach, 343 U.S.

at 313-14 (the state should accommodate and encourage religion); Michael McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933, 940 (1986) (under
coercion test government may pursue legitimate goals which aid the cause of religion).
158. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792 (stating that prayer before opening legislative session is
merely a "tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this country");
Michael McConnell, Accommodation ofReligion, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 3 (there is a gray area
in which government may permissibly facilitate the exercise of religious liberty).
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prevent. 1
Additionally, the coercion test does not present any of the logical inconsistencies which exist under an endorsement analysis. The fact that every act
of government necessarily endorses some belief system presents no problem,
since the coercion test implicitly recognizes that government must endorse
something, and allows this endorsement, as long as it abridges no one's freedom of conscience.' ° As to the problem of shifting toward a more "religion-friendly" standard posed by the logic of the Reitner Court, the coercion
test does not pretend to be a religiously neutral, but allows governmental
endorsement of religious belief in general.1 6 ' A shift from Lemon to the
more "religion-friendly" standard of non-coercion will send the message to
citizens that the government favors religious belief, but will coerce no one to
practice a religion or believe in any religion at all, which is consistent with
the coercion test.1 62 The coercion test appears to be closely in line with the
history of the Establishment Clause, as Madison put it: "that Congress

159. CompareAllegheny, 492 U.S. at 659 (Kennedy, J., dissenting & concurring) quoting
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 206 (acts which tend to establish a state religion constitute coercion) with
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 730 (Joseph Gales, ed. 1789) (Madison suggested wording the Establishment Clause to prevent Congress' establishing a national religion).
160. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 662 (Kennedy, J., dissenting & concurring) (government
may accommodate religion and even share in celebration of religious holidays); Thomas R.
McCoy & Gary A. Kurtz, A Unifying Theory for the Religion Clauses of the FirstAmendment,
39 VAND. L. REV. 249, 252 (1986) (paraphrasing Justice Black, "any governmental interference with religion necessarily would involve at least an implicit approval of establishment of
other beliefs or practices considered acceptable"); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions,and
DoctrinalIllusion&: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L.
REV. 266, 287-88 (1987) (showing that religious beliefs will inevitably have some influence on
government). Government may endorse religion in general. See Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313-14
("[w]hen the state encourages religious instruction ... it follows the best of our traditions");
American Jewish Congress, 827 F.2d at 135 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (in endorsing freedom
of religion, Jefferson was endorsing religion).
161. See Mergens, - U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 2377-78, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 208 (government
may endorse religion so long as endorsement does not rise to the level of coercion); Allegheny,
492 U.S. at 662 (government may accommodate religion and even share in celebration of religious holidays by making them public holidays, erecting religious displays, sponsoring parades, and giving government employees and school children holiday vacations). "[I]t is
difficult to maintain the fiction that requiring government to avoid all assistance of religion can
in fairness be viewed as serving the goal of neutrality." Id. at 657; see also Steven Smith,
Separation and the "Secular":Reconstructing the DisestablishmentDecision, 67 TEx. L. REV.
955, 1015 (1989) (promoting institutional separation between church and state which would
not necessitate symbolic separation).
162. Recalling the logic in Reitner, shifting from anti-discrimination to neutrality sent the
massage that government endorsed discrimination. Reitner v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 375
(1967). When this logic is applied to the endorsement test, one finds that shifting from Lemon
to a more "religion-friendly" standard sends the message that government endorses religion,
thus violating the endorsement test. Cf. Id. (the logic used in Reitner is applied here). The
coercion test does not suffer from this internal inconsistency because, although a shift to the
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should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law,
nor compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to their
conscience."163
CONCLUSION

This Comment began with a quotation from the Gospel of John ending
with Pilate asking, "What is truth?" Pilate, the secular authority, was concerned with the practical, with keeping the peace, and did what he felt necessary to attain that objective. In the pursuit of freedom, and in a wellintentioned effort to prevent religious persecution and oppression, the
Supreme Court, with the tacit approval of the American people, has attempted to accommodate all religions with the result of accommodating
none. The god of Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been devoutly
worshiped, and sacrifices of pro-religious legislation have been offered on the
altar of separation for over fifty years. However, the time has come to abandon the god of establishment and return to the true intent of the framers.
The above analysis indicates that the coercion test is most in line with that
intent, and should be adopted by the Court.
In reality, whether the Court chooses coercion, or endorsement, or leaves
the Establishment Clause in the hands of Lemon, to continue drifting aimlessly about the jurisprudential sea, is irrelevant. What matters is that in
applying whatever standard it chooses, the Court keeps in mind the intent of
the framers-the spirit which gave, and still gives, the Constitution life. The
Constitution, despite the many great things it has done for America, is only
parchment. It is the principles underlying the Constitution which made
America great. These principles were the product of religious people, many
of whom left their homes, fleeing the reign of tyrants, in order to worship
God according to the dictates of their consciences. It is the principles we
venerate, not the parchment; it is God we worship, not the king. During the
past fifty years, however, we have placed the parchment above the principles,
and have pursued what we believed to be in the best interest of the king at
God's expense.
Our national motto is "In God we trust." We should guard that motto
well, and strive to be worthy of it, lest we be heard to say. ...
Had I but served God with half the zeal
I serv'd my king, he would not in mine age
Have left me naked to mine enemies.
Henry the Eighth Act I, sc 2.

coercion test will endorse religion, it will not coerce; and coercion is what the coercion test
proscribes. Cf Id. (applying logic from Reitner to implementation of the coercion test).

163. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 730 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (emphasis added).
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